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The Necessity for Regulating the Insurance 








In 2018, the Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD) was fully implemented by all EU 
member states. It intends to harmonize the insurance market, provide the right 
incentives for the agents and protect the consumers. But why? The core business of 
the banking sector makes it necessary for a prudential authority to intervene and 
monitor. The question arises if the latest changes in the insurance business require these 
limitations and monitoring. This paper offers a literature review by compiling findings 
and setting up profound arguments, why the regulation of insurance companies is 
relevant. The main arguments for a strong prudential regulation are transparency, 
information asymmetry and agency problems, wrong incentives, a representation of 
the policyholder and the inversion of the production cycle. These findings make it 
necessary to regulate the companies and protect the policyholders. Further research 
should focus on case studies of insurance companies implementing the changes of 
IDD into daily business.  
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Introduction 
The financial market is regulated. The following chapter describes the latest history of 
insurance regulations. Furthermore, it gives a brief insight in the differences of 
regulating banks to insurance companies.  
 Since the foundation of the European Community in 1957 many directives were 
issued. They target a more integrated financial market and a harmonized approach 
(Cummins, Rubio-Misas & Vencappa, 2017, p. 67). The past 25 years the financial 
market have undergone a deregulation process through the European Union’s Third 
Generation Insurance Directive which was implemented in 1994. Creating a single 
European insurance market with a better diversification and a strong competition 
should have a positive effect on the choice of the policyholders with a variety of 
insurance products (Cummins et al., 2017, p. 66). The latest changes began with the 
consideration of Solvency II in 2007. This risk-based economic regulatory approach 
was implemented by European insurers. It is consistent for all member states. It aims at 
reflecting the risk that companies face and sets up a profound supervisory system. It 
not only focuses on the protection on customers but also on the stability of the 
financial system, especially the insurance industry (Cummins et al., 2017, p. 67). A 
significant transformation of the supervision of financial institutions occurred during the 
financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 (Doff, 2008, pp. 196–198). From then on, the European 
commission is constantly working for a harmonization of the regulatory framework 
across the EU member countries. This implies implementing standards to react to a 
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II, similar to the European banking regulatory framework Basel II, focuses on new 
requirements for insurers, provides the right incentives and is a risk-based approach 
(Doff, 2016, p. 604; Lorent, 2008, pp. 24–25). In 2018 the Insurance Distribution Directive 
(IDD) or RL 2016/97/EU was fully implemented by all EU member states. It is a directive 
issued by the Council of the European Union. The directive was developed as a 
consequence of regulatory changes. It intends to strengthen the consumer protection 
and establishes a competitive and harmonized landscape of the insurance business 
in the European Union (Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council). 
 The necessity for general financial regulation is well discussed in economic theory. 
In most of the literature, the focus lies in regulating banks rather than insurance 
companies. Many principles apply for financial institutions in general but there are 
differences in the nature of the two businesses (Konstantinides, 2003). The insurance 
sector and the regulations of insurance companies have evolved dramatically over 
the last years. These chances imply a strong connection to the banking sector (Lorent, 
2008, p. 2). Das, Davies, and Podpiera (2003) state that the insurance business is 
traditionally seen as a stable financial sector. The liquidity liabilities within the banking 
industry increases the risk of contagious runs. Traditionally insurance companies are 
not affected by those runs (Das et al., 2003, p. 14, 2003, p. 3). Another evidence of a 
stronger bond between banks and insurance companies are partnerships and 
bancassurance. For over 20 years now, banks and insurers sell each other’s products 
to grow through synergy effects. This cross-selling strategy initiated the development 
of complex risk management products, which is a challenge for the regulator to 
understand and evaluate them (Das et al., 2003, pp. 11–12).  
 Insurance companies offer products which are similar to saving products offered 
from banks (Lorent, 2008, p. 2). In the last years insurance companies transformed and 
positioned themselves as major actors within the financial market. New financial 
innovations modified the portfolios and increased the complexity of financial 
products. The liquidity risk and the systemic risk became higher. Life insurance products 
extended and became more similar to banking products. The new options within 
these products raised the liquidity of the liabilities. Because of these changes, there is 
now a clear difference to traditional insurance products, which reveals a new 
exposure (Lorent, 2008, pp. 24–25). Insurance companies generally have longer-term 
liabilities in comparison to banks (Das et al., 2003, p. 9). Implementing bank-type 
products is also a method of an insurance company to compete with other financial 
institutions on the market. These products bear higher risks and create more liquid 
liabilities in the financial statement. As a consequence, the insurance company needs 
to invest further in risky assets and is dependent on the economic growth of the market 
(Das et al., 2003, p. 3). In general, insurance companies have more liquid assets than 
banks, for example bonds, loans, real estate and equities. Therefore, insurers have a 
lower liquidity risk. Looking at assets and liabilities, a distinction between non-life and 
life insurance companies has to be made. Within the non-life sector, liabilities are short 
term. The claims that arise from non-life products are unpredictable in terms of 
occurrence and amount. The assets, which cover liabilities from a non-life item thus 
need to be of high liquidity. Therefore, non-life insurance companies hold more liquid 
assets than banks. Liabilities and assets within the life insurance sector are long-term 
oriented. The matching duration of assets and liabilities of their insurance products is 
a constant objective of the insurance company (Lorent, 2008, p. 8). Das et al. (2003) 
share this view in their research. The insurance industry changed and linked stronger 
to banks. This is especially supported through activities attributed to the banking 
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to increase the vulnerability and endangers the financial stability of the insurance 
sector (Das et al., 2003, p. 3). 
 The core business of a bank makes it illiquid and fragile by nature. This is the reason 
for bank runs. Banks are connected within the interbank market and finance each 
other. Systemic panics may occur within the banking sector and cause global 
economic crises. In contrast to banks which invest in bank loans and bank deposits, 
insurance companies are more liquid with their investment in tradable assets. The 
reinsurance market reduces the contagion effect and prevent panics (Plantin & 
Rochet, 2009, p. 2). Reinsurance plays an important role stabilizing the volatility and 
absorbing peaks of claims from big natural catastrophes. Reinsurance acts similar to 
a capital supplier to the insurers. Therefore, a failure of large reinsurance companies 
could result in contagions and have a high potential to disrupt the financial system 
(Das et al., 2003, p. 16). On the contrary, the interbank market can’t dam the fragility 
and the contagion which occurs in the banking sector (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, p. 2). 
However, insurance companies are not completely immune to crises (Das et al., 2003, 
p. 14). Considering the changing core business of insurance companies and the fact 
that insurance products become more similar to banking products, the industry is 
exposed to liquidity risk (Lorent, 2008, pp. 24–25). Lorent (2008) states that a stronger 
connection between the financial market and insurance companies is a danger for 
the economy. The insurance industry could face an insurance run as well. The systemic 
financial stability becomes more important and Lorent (2008) calls for a stronger 
supervisory framework on financial risks within the insurance market. Most literature 
and empirical evidence on insurance regulations ignores the fact of possible 
insurance runs. Morrison (2002) says that a run is no typical phenomena and cannot 
take place within the insurance sector. Another fundamental difference between 
banks and insurers, is the right of a policyholder in comparison to a depositor. 
Policyholders of insurance contracts often need to pay a compensation fee for 
possible withdrawal of the contract. The cancellation repayment of an insurance 
product is usually a longer period than for a bank deposit (Lorent, 2008, p. 8; Plantin 
& Rochet, 2009, pp. 92–93). Furthermore, Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996)  
differentiate between the possible scenario of panics and distress for a bank and for 
an insurance company. The big differences lay in the liquidity and the systemic risk. 
When a bank suffers from a financial distress the consequence is a liquidity problem. 
This happens because the liabilities of a bank are demandable deposits. As soon as 
the depositors think their deposits are unsafe, they’ll withdraw their money. This was 
initially the reason for the implementation of security nets of central banks. Demirgüc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1997) argue that those systematic safety nets were responsible 
for emerging financial crisis. They develop a safe haven and support the moral hazard 
behavior of bankers. Often control systems are governmental owned, so the intention 
of exploitation rises. Banks that should have been closed in the past were saved 
because of political reasons (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, pp. 90–91). Polonchek and Miller 
(1999) performed a detailed empirical study about the impact of the announcement 
of capital information for insurance companies. Announcing the emission of new 
capital is generally seen as bad news and has a negative impact within the banking 
sector. The stock price of other banks in the system is affected and contagion will 
occur if one bank suffers from distress. Polonchek and Miller (1999) didn’t find any 
evidence for this contagion effect within the insurance sector. Statistically the 
contagion effect for insurers can happen but is very small in comparison to banks. Das 
et al. (2003) support this statement but differentiate for insurance companies with 
traditional products. For those insurers the contagion may be smaller. Depositors can 
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depositors will take a higher future interest or a lower interest now to save their money. 
Channelling an insurance contract goes hand in hand with considering higher costs 
for potential claims and replacing the policy. The cancellation repayment of an 
insurance policy generally takes more time than repaying the bank deposit. For 
policyholders of traditional insurance products it is not convenient to take their money 
out of the insurance company (Das et al., 2003, p. 15). 
 Only looking at the core business of a bank and an insurance company, there is no 
need for stronger regulations on the insurance market. The liquidity and the systemic 
risk in the banking system are drastic but within the insurance sector much lower. 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) suggest to focus on the claimholder. With their 
representation hypothesis they state that the regulatory framework should act as a 
representative of the claimholder. Das et al. (2003) study big insurance failures in the 
past. They look at the factors that played an important role for the failures. The most 
important factor is the financial deregulation that allows the insurance company to 
perform bank-type activities and offer bank-similar products. Another factor 
described is the close linkage between banks and insurers (Das et al., 2003, p. 18). 
Insurance companies failed because they invested in risky assets such as junk bonds 
in order to meet the high return on liabilities. As soon as a recession in the economy 
emerged those risky investments became a high burden for the insurance company 
(Das et al., 2003, p. 20). 
 
Why regulate Insurance? 
The following section presents arguments, why the insurance industry needs to be 
regulated. Most of them would be missing in a free market and would result in negative 
consequences for shareholders, managers and policyholders. The International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) defines the Insurance Core Principles. They 
state that a regulatory system is necessary for a save and fair insurance sector. The 
focus lies on the protection and the interests of the policyholders and the overall 
stability of the financial system (IAIS, 2018, p. 4). 
 Lorent (2008) emphasizes the necessity of transparency. In comparison to other 
sectors, the insurance sector is in general less transparent. A high disclosure about the 
risk management is becoming increasingly important. The rising complexity of 
insurance products and internal models for transferring risk demand a higher level of 
transparent information (Lorent, 2008, p. 25). Borio et. al. (2004) also highlight the 
importance of market discipline connected with increased transparency. Regulations 
alone are not as successful for a strong and solvent insurance industry. A higher level 
of transparency creates a higher pressure on other insurance companies to provide 
their policyholders with appropriate products and services (Eling, Schmeiser & Schmit, 
2007, p. 17). 
 The phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection is found in insurance 
institutions. A policyholder which has an insurance contract doesn’t need to bear the 
full consequence of his or her behaviour. For example, a policyholder of a motor 
contract can drive faster and more irresponsible. In case of an accident, the 
policyholder doesn’t need to bear the costs of repairing the car. The motivation to 
reduce the risk for an accident decreases when the risk is transferred to the insurance 
company. The insurance institution doesn’t have any control on the behaviour of the 
policyholders. Otherwise, the insurance company also need to cope with information 
asymmetries. The policyholder has more information on his or her own level of risk than 
the insurance company. People with higher risk profiles are more willing to conclude 
an insurance contract than people with lower risk profiles. Because of the missing 
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companies price their contracts at an average level. Low risk profiles fund the high-
risk profiles. Pricing the average risk profile works well, as long as low risk profiles won’t 
decide to quit their contracts (Lorent, 2008, p. 5). Klein (1995) states in his public interest 
theory that regulations are necessary because of these imperfections in the insurance 
market. Regulators should prevent moral hazard and adverse selection and reduces 
the conflict of interest between the different parties of an insurance contract. Also 
Butsic (1994) says that a regulatory framework is needed to resolve market 
imperfections (Butsic, 1994, p. 658). Plantin and Rochet (2009) believe that market 
imperfections are the reasons for insurance regulations. The objective of the regulatory 
framework is to simulate perfect market conditions to save the policyholders and to 
compensate the existing agency problems (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, pp. 27–28). During 
daily business, equity holders have the control right and take all relevant decisions 
about the company. In the case of an imminent insolvency the debtholders of an 
insurance company become the most important decision makers and take the 
control rights. They decide on the restructuring or the liquidation of the company. This 
is an understandable process and therefore it would be obvious to write this down in 
the corporate contract and implement this procedure within the management. This 
would be independent of the future leading management and could support quickly, 
making the right decisions when necessary. But because is seems to be difficult to 
include possible future actions, contracts stay incomplete (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, 
p. 59).  
 Plantin and Rochet (2009) say that agents don’t have the right incentives to act 
correctly in the case of distress. Prudential supervision seems pointless when people 
e.g. shareholders and managers with control rights and the necessary information 
don’t act correctly because of a wrong incentive system (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, 
p. 12). A case study showed that implementing the wrong incentives build 
unprofitable companies. Passive shareholders, short-term planning and hiring agents 
without a performance-based model support the downfall conditioned by wrong 
incentives (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, p. 14).    
 The International Association of Insurance Supervisors state that the principle 
objective of supervision is the protection of the policyholder (IAIS, 2018, p. 17). 
Policyholders don’t know how their paid premiums are used. Policyholders are as well 
not capable of evaluating the financial stability of the insurance company 
(Dewatripont & Tirole, 1999). This is because insurance companies are too complex for 
policyholders to understand the processes behind (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, pp. 27–28). 
Consumers are generally not interested in the profits of the firm. They just want the 
insurance company to pay their claims at the right moment. They want to be sure that 
the insurance company is capable of paying the claims during the lifetime of the 
product. Regulations should guarantee that the insurance company meets its 
obligations and protects the policyholder (OECD, 1998). Policyholders are not able to 
protect themselves against the insolvency of insurance companies by holding a 
diversified portfolio with more insurance companies to compensate one collapse 
(Cummins, 2002). Generally, policyholders rely on one insurance company for every 
insurance contract (Lorent, 2008, pp. 5–6). Policyholders can’t use their control rights 
in practice. Therefore, a regulatory framework within the prudential authority needs to 
support the policyholders. This should be the representative of the policyholders and 
their claims in the governmental structure. During the time of distress, the regulator 
should function as a proxy and play the role of a claimholder, in order to protect their 
interests (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, p. 63). Another reason for prudential regulations is 
that claimholders will always demand the payment of their claims. This is independent 
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an insolvency. If a claimholder would be willing to cut his or her losses in time of distress, 
the liquidity problems could be dammed easily (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, pp. 27–28).  
 One reason why insurance companies face agency problems is the inversion of the 
production cycle in the insurance industry. The distinctiveness of the insurance industry 
in comparison to other goods and services is that the insurance service is required long 
time after the product is purchased. Typically, premiums are paid by the policyholders 
when the contract is signed and permanently during the lifetime of the product. The 
compensation is paid by the insurer in case of an existing claim. This may happen after 
several years or probably never (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, pp. 43–44).  In case of a claim 
the insurer intermediates the risk directly. They use tools like diversification and risk 
pooling to manage the risk (IAIS, 2018, p. 4). The process of paying premiums in 
advance is applied because the premiums can’t be collected afterwards, especially 
not for policyholders who didn’t experience a claim or a loss. The actual production 
costs of insurance products can only be defined long time after the contracts have 
been underwritten and the corresponding premiums are paid (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, 
pp. 43–44). Another feature of the inverse production cycle of the insurance industry 
is that the insurers can alter the risk profile during the existing contract. Policyholders 
could experience changes in their policies due to changes of the company, without 
the possibility to intervene for the policyholders (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, pp. 53–54). 
Moreover, the inversion of the production cycle motivates managers to compensate 
difficulties by taking riskier policies with higher premiums. Losses don’t automatically 
result in insolvency. Managers can react and take higher risks to compensate 
imminent losses (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, pp. 27–28). The inversion of the production 
cycle creates dangerous agency problems. These can be mitigated by introducing a 
regulatory framework and capital requirements for insurance companies (Plantin 
& Rochet, 2009, pp. 53–54). 
 
Conclusion 
A regulatory structure matters when the system suffers from agency problems and 
information asymmetries. The inverted production cycle and the time difference 
between purchasing a contract and getting the output in the insurance sector is the 
reason for the existence of these problems. Therefore, insurance companies need to 
be highly capitalized and exhibit a high liquidity. Unfortunately, this is not enough. 
Shareholders, managers and policyholders don’t have the right incentives to make 
the right decisions when the company is in distress. Therefore, an external regulatory 
framework needs to be introduced (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, pp. 53–54). The main 
reasons presented above strengthen the necessity of prudential regulations. Plantin 
and Rochet (2009) emphasize that introducing a strong regulatory authority doesn’t 
imply the elimination of failures. In general, failures are important in the economy to 
identify and distinguish between efficient and inefficient firms. Moreover, reducing 
failures is a necessary objective for managers, which most of the time isn’t contained 
in their incentive model. When the consequence of a failure happens, usually this is 
expensive and has a negative impact on the employees and policyholders. Therefore, 
it is relevant to set up a model that reduces failures but doesn’t eliminate them 
completely. Without any failures, insurers would stop taking risks and start abandoning 
their core business. The solvency requirements would be huge and therefore financial 
services within the insurance market would be extremely costly. Regulations should 
supervise and intervene when insurance companies need to be restructured, but 
don’t eliminate the free market and therefore the possibility for insurance companies 
to fail (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, pp. 57–58). Gaganis and Pasiouras (2013) point out the 
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synergies and is more efficient when it comes to functions and expertise. Additionally, 
it prevents regulatory gaps and duplicated control functions. A unified system sets 
clear responsibilities and increases the commitment of the supervisor (Gaganis 
& Pasiouras, 2013, p. 5464). 
 Otherwise, there are situations in the insurance industry where regulating is not 
needed because the parties don’t face agency problems. This is the case when a 
large and experienced broker makes a contract with an insurance company on 
behalf of his or her policyholder. When no regulations are present, the broker would 
not enter into a contract with an insurance company which credit rating is low. One 
option would be to reduce the premium for the policyholder in order to compensate 
the higher default risk of the insurer. Because the broker represents the policyholder 
and acts in his or her name, the broker would not do business with a company being 
poorly capitalized. In summary, when the policyholder is represented by a broker, the 
decision to enter into a contract or not in a free market are similar to a regulatory 
based system. Generally, prudential authorities differ from brokers in many points. A 
regulator checks the capital adequacy of the insurer and makes important 
reorganization or liquidation decisions (Plantin & Rochet, 2009, p. 58). 
 By the end of 2018 the Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD) was fully implemented 
by all EU member states. This directive intends to harmonize the insurance business in 
the EU, provides the right incentives for sales agents and protects the policyholders. 
The main arguments presented in this literature review are covered in the IDD. Those 
are transparency, information asymmetry and agency problems, incentives, a 
representation of the policyholder and the inversion of the production cycle. 
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